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Royal Decree-Law 22/2018 and Royal Decree 102/2019 
empowered the Banco de España to develop a new 
macroprudential toolkit applicable to the banking sector to 
address systemic risks, including a sectoral countercyclical 
capital buffer (SCoCCyB), which is built in as an additional 
component of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), 
sectoral concentration limits (SCLs) for credit exposures, 
and limits and conditions on lending and other transactions 
(known internationally as Borrower-Based Instruments or 
BBIs). This regulatory development is part of a broader 
reform establishing the Spanish macroprudential authority 
(AMCESFI) and allocating new macroprudential tools to 
the three sectoral supervisory authorities: the Banco de 
España, the National Securities Market Commission 
(CNMV) and the Directorate General of Insurance and 
Pension Funds (DGSFP).
In this setting, on 2 February the Banco de España 
submitted a draft amendment of Circular 2/2016 on the 
supervision and solvency of credit institutions for public 
consultation2,3. This reform aims, firstly, to establish new 
CCyB regulation that is consistent with the revised wording 
of Article 45(1) of Law 10/2014 and which allows the Banco 
de España to require such a buffer both for all the credit 
exposures of an institution and for those to a specific 
sector (i.e. the SCoCCyB, defined as a sectoral component 
of the CCyB). Likewise, the reform implements regulations 
on the setting of SCLs for credit exposures and also of 
certain limits and conditions on the granting of BBIs. 
The Banco de España, as the designated authority for 
using macroprudential tools for the banking sector, is 
responsible for safeguarding financial stability by seeking 
to prevent systemic financial shocks that could have an 
adverse impact on the real economy. To this end, it must 
have at its disposal the tools needed for carrying out this 
task effectively4.
The aim of the SCoCCyB is to contain the systemic risk 
arising from potential imbalances (excessive credit growth) 
that may emerge in a given economic sector, by seeking to 
alter the relative cost, in regulatory capital terms, of lending 
to that sector. In turn, in order to avoid undesirable side-
effects stemming from its application, the reaction of other 
sectors must be monitored in order to prevent the 
excessive credit growth from shifting to them. The 
SCoCCyB also seeks to provide institutions with sufficient 
capital to cope with potential losses from a disorderly 
propagation of the imbalances originating in the sector 
where excessive credit growth is detected.
Implementation of the SCoCCyB must strike an appropriate 
balance between the accuracy and the scope of the 
definition of the economic sectors giving rise to the 
imbalances. Historical evidence shows that, in previous 
crises, most systemic risks were concentrated in exposures 
to specific economic sectors, as was the case for the real 
estate sector in the run-up to the global financial crisis (see 
Chart 1). However, the definition of the sectors subject to 
this measure must be broad enough to ensure that the tool 
has the broad-based scope proper to its macroprudential 
purpose. Empirical evidence suggests that the SCoCCyB 
should generally be activated at the earliest stages of the 
build-up of the systemic risk. Its release should be 
immediate if the systemic risk materialises and progressive 
if it gradually subsides.
The SCL tool limits the total volume of credit exposures to 
a specific sector. This limitation is defined relative to a 
capital metric, not as a limit on the absolute level of 
exposure. Thus, if a particular institution decides to further 
increase its exposure to a sector subject to such limit, it 
may do so as long as it sufficiently increases its capital 
levels. In this way, it would be able to cope with potential 
losses in the sector in which the systemic risk builds up. 
Chart 2 shows how exposure to real estate credit grew 
relative to bank capital before the global financial crisis 
and how this was subsequently corrected. 
As the SCL is also a sectoral tool, some of its features 
are analogous to those of the SCoCCyB. Again, this 
requires a cautious analysis of the potential spillovers to 
1  This box is based on the content of C. Trucharte Artigas (2021), “Nuevas Herramientas Macroprudenciales para las entidades de crédito”, Revista de 
Economía, No. 918, ICE.
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other sectors that might be produced by limits in a specific 
sector, and the proper identification of sectors with an 
effect on systemic risk. The key difference between this 
tool and the SCoCCyB is that its activation would limit 
sectoral credit concentration growth more directly (as this 
would be done via a restriction on quantity), while the 
SCoCCyB would act more via disincentives, by making it 
more expensive, in relative capital terms, to increase the 
credit exposure to the sector or sectors for which it has 
been activated. For this reason, the SCL can be generally 
considered as a last resort, to be used in the later stages 
of the unfolding of the systemic risk when the other tools 
have proved to be ineffective. However, in special 
circumstances it could also be used earlier. It should be 
immediately deactivated upon materialisation or 
dissipation of the systemic risk.
BBIs monitor credit standards in the granting of financing 
(for example, value of collateral, term, capacity to repay 
the loan). The available evidence suggests that loans 
granted under lax criteria, be it in terms of the value 
covered by the required collateral, leverage, the debt-
to-income ratio required of borrowers or maturity, entail 
higher repayment risks down the line5.
The decision to set limits on some characteristics rather 
than others will depend on the nature of the systemic risk, 
and the most effective alternative for its mitigation will be 
decided accordingly. However, it must be borne in mind 
that setting limits on a particular characteristic may lead to 
easing others, requiring action to be taken on several 
characteristics at the same time. Moreover, the easing of 
standards may spill over to other credit portfolios, requiring 
the measures to be extended to them.
BBI regulation should also provide for the possibility of 
adjusting the limitations according to the characteristics 
of the borrower and the lender, thus ensuring their 
effectiveness and that they do not impinge 
disproportionately on a specific group or hinder other 
public policy measures. These limitations through BBIs 
would be activated on an individual basis or jointly and 
will be in place alongside other macroprudential tools. 
Generally speaking, this instrument should be activated 
in the intermediate stages of the build-up of the 
systemic risk.
The reform of Circular 2/2016 thus expands the toolkit 
that has to date been available to the Banco de España, 
in its role as designated authority for the use of 
macroprudential instruments for the banking sector. 
These tools are specifically designed to control systemic 
risk and would therefore make it possible to limit, for 
example, the potential adverse effects that an overly lax 
5	 	See	J.	Galán	and	M.	Lamas	(2019),	“Beyond	the	LTV	ratio:	new	macroprudential	lessons	from	Spain”, Working Paper No. 1931, Banco de España, for 
an empirical analysis of the impact of mortgage credit standards in Spain on default behaviour.
SOURCE: Banco de España.



































































ADJUSTED REAL ESTATE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP
ADJUSTED CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP (right-hand scale)
Chart 1
TOTAL AND SECTORAL  (real estate credit) CREDIT-TO-GDP GAPS (a)
Chart 2
RATIO OF REAL ESTATE CREDIT TO TOTAL CAPITAL
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monetary policy could have on excessive risk-taking by 
agents. These tools can also be adapted to the financial cycle 
and to specific shocks in the Spanish banking sector. These 
features are very useful for building resilience and the capacity 
to absorb unexpected shocks, as evidenced by the current 
economic crisis arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
fulfilment of these objectives of the new framework will need 
to be underpinned by the Banco de España’s risk analysis 
capabilities and a measured application of this new wide-
ranging toolkit.
